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This article reconsiders  the recently controversial  issues of  whether  an 
interest rate rule is  feasible and  whether it  leaves nominal  magnitudes 
indeterminate.  It is  shown  that interest rate rules are infeasible unless  the 
policy authorities possess  complete  current information.  Furthermore, 
interest rate rules do not complete  prototype macroeconomic  models  under 
rational expectations with no money  illusion.  Some  influential analyses  due 
to  McCallum (1981,  1986)  are reinterpreted in  a manner  consistent with these 
propositions. 
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I. Introduction 
Sargent and  Wallace  (1975)  presented the first dynamic  model  showing  that 
if  an  interest rate rule is substituted in  place of  a money  supply rule,  then 
nominal  variables are indeterminate.  This  article revalidates the Sargent  and 
Wallace  indeterminacy result.  McCallum  (1981)  sought  to  modify  this result, 
contending that interest rate rules do  not result in  nominal  indeterminacy if 
they are chosen  with any  degree  of concern about  the consequences  for the 
money  stock.  Canzoneri,  Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983)  then argued  that the 
authorities can  peg  the interest rate,  even  at a  constant  level,  and  the 
nominal  determinacy  problem will not arise,  so  long as  the authorities 
announce  a  trend for the money  supply.  McCallum  (19861,  considering this 
result,  clarified or interpreted it  to  mean  that private expectations of the 
money  supply are not anchored  by  an  interest rate rule unless it  is  a  1  imi  ting 
case  of  an  underlying money  supply function,  as  the elasticity of the money 
supply with respect to  the interest rate increases  without limit. 
A  view has  developed  that interest rate rules are feasible and  determine 
nominal  magnitudes,  if they are  limiting cases  of  a well-specified money 
supply  function or if they are directed toward  the achievement  of  money 
targets.  A number  of papers  rely critically on  the notion of  the feasibility 
of interest rate rules.  For  example,  Dotsey  and  King (1983,  1986)  find  that 
interest rate rules have  the disadvantage of removing  information  signals 
otherwise available to  private agents,  by  eliminating any  observable relation 
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their model,  the elasticity of the money  supply  with respect  to the interest 
rate is  entirely irrelevant,  unless  that elasticity can  be  infinite,  in  which 
case  the signals available to  agents are reduced. 
The  widespread popular  idea that policies designed  to  control money, 
prices,  and/or  other nominal  variables can  be  formulated,  described,  and 
executed in terms of  predetermined  interest rates is vulnerable  to  both the 
infeasibility and  indeterminacy  problems.  Unless  and  until these problems  can 
be  resolved,  there can be  no objective basis for such  a policy designed  in 
terms of interest rates.  These  problems  can  be  avoided by  placing feasible, 
meaningful  constraints directly on  the money  stock via a money  supply 
function. 
11.  Concepts  and  Definitions 
Interest rate rules are often seen  as  descriptions of policy.  This 
section presents  the view  that it  is  more  precise to  distinguish interest rate 
rules from decision rules,  or truly structural equations  for  monetary  policy. 
The  latter are easier to  motivate on  a formal  level  than are interest rate 
rules,  so  discussion begins  with them. 
A  money  supply function is  a structural equation.  It specifies a decision 
by  the authorities concerning  the quantity of  money  to  supply,  contingent on 
the observed  state of the economy.  The  observed state of the economy  is the 
set of  information  available at the  time of the decision about  the quantity of 
money.  Realistically, it  includes  the current nominal  interest rate and 
lagged state vector.  An  example  of  a money  supply function appropriate  to 
standard log-linear macroeconomic  models  is: 
mt=qRt+pSt-,  (1) 
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R,  is  the log of  one  plus the interest rate, 
is  the lagged  state vector, 
and  q and  p are finite parameters  representing policy choice. 
q and  p must  be  finite  or (1)  is  not a valid expression.  Incidentally, 
the money  supply function can  be  renormal  ized with the nominal  interest rate 
on  the left-hand side,  as  in: 
~,=q-~m,-(q-'~)s,-,  (2) 
so  long as  q is  nonzero.  Regardless of  how  the money  supply  function  is 
written,  the current money  stock,  m,,  must  appear. 
An  interest rate rule is  a strict relation between  the current nominal 
interest rate and  the lagged  state vector.  In  other words,  an  interest rate 
rule is a requirement or restriction that the interest rate behave  in  a 
particular predetermined manner.  Under  the rule,  the current interest rate is 
invariant with respect  to  current innovations in the state vector.  The 
feature  that distinguishes  an  interest rate rule from  a money  supply function 
is that the former  excludes  the current money  stock as  an  argument.  For 
example,  the equation 
Rt=po+plRt-I+~2mt+p3mt-l  (3) 
represents a money  supply function if pi  is  nonzero,  but represents an 
interest rate rule if  p2 is  zero. 
Money  supply functions  and  interest rate rules are fundamentally different 
kinds of relations.  The  money  supply function is a structural equation:  it 
is  logically prior to the solution to  the model.  The  analyst can  write down 
the money  supply function and  the nonpolicy structural  equations and  from  them 
derive solutions for endogenous  variables,  as  will be  illustrated below.  On 
the other hand,  an  interest rate rule is a restriction on  the behavior of the 
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then an  interest rate rule cannot  adequately  represent  an  operational  policy. 
What  is  needed  is  a decision rule for an  actual  choice  variable.  Among 
candidate variables in the structure, only money  is appropriately conceived  as 
a feasible  choice variable.  Then  feasible policy can  be  described adequately 
only in terms  of a rule for  the behavior of the money  stock  as  a function of 
the observed  state.  In  other words,  policy can  be  adequately  and 
operationally described only in  terms of  a money  supply function. 
An  interest rate rule can  be  interpreted only as  a restriction on  the 
solution or outcome  of the model.  Indeed,  the interest rate rule, if it in 
fact  holds  true in  an  economy,  is the reduced-form equation for the  interest 
rate. 
111.  Nominal  Determinacy  in  a Prototype Model 
This  section presents  a  simple model  and  shows  how  money  and prices are 
determined by  solving the money  supply function and  the nonpolicy  structural 
equations  simultaneously. 
Consider  the following illustrative macroeconomic  model.  Let aggregate 
demand  be  a function of the real rate of interest and  a disturbance,  while 
aggregate  supply  is  a constant.  Formally: 
y:  =  do-dCRt-(Et-,pt+l-pt)I+ut,  d>O  (4) 
y:  =  yF  (5) 
where  y:  and  y:  are aggregate  demand  and  supply,  respectively;  p, 
is the log of the price level;  y
f
 is  a fixed output supply;  and  u,  is  a 
nonautocorrelated disturbance to  aggregate demand.  The  lagged expectation 
operator,  E,-,,  when  applied to  pt+,,  returns the objective mathematical 
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of the state vector. '  Then  the commodity  market equi 1 i  brium condition,  or 
IS function,  is 
Rt =  rt  +  (Et-l~t+~-p~)  (6) 
where  the (ex  ante)  real rate, 
r, =  (l/d)C(do-yf)+utl,  (7) 
is exogenous.  (do-yf)  will be  taken as  zero.  This assumption  is 
heuristic only; it  has  the effect of  making  the mean  of the real rate equal  to 
zero,  thereby  simplifying mathematical  expressions  that follow. 
Let the money  demand  function be 
mt-pt=ao-aRt+et,  a>O,  (8) 
where  m,  is the quantity of  money  and  e,  is  a white-noise disturbance. 
For  the purpose at  hand,  it  will suffice to  consider a  simplified version 
of the money  supply function analyzed by  McCallum (1986): 
mt=Xo+X(Rt-R*),  -(l+a)<X<m,  (9) 
where  R*  is  an  interest rate target.  R*  is treated as  a  constant to  simplify 
analysis. 
The  economic  structure is composed  of the  two nonpolicy equations,  the IS 
function,  (6),  and  the money  demand  function,  (8),  plus the policy equation, 
or money  supply function,  (9).  It  is easy  to show  that these  three equations 
are sufficient to  provide  solutions for the  three endogenous  variables,  p,, 
mt  , R,,  as  well  as  the endogenous  expectation Et-lpt+l.  It is useful 
for what  follows  to  show  how  the method  of undetermined  coefficients can  be 
used  to  solve  the model  if an  appropriate  state vector can  be  identified. 
Formally,  a  state vector  is a  set of  dated variables,  both predetermined 
and  exogenous,  that completely describe the position,  or state,  of  a dynamic 
system.  Current realizations of endogenous  variables are strict functions of 
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given  systems  in  order to  hypothesize  a trial solution,  whose  arguments  are 
the state vector and  whose  coefficients are functions of structural 
parameters.  Given  a (linear)  trial solution--based on  an  adequate  state 
vector--and given a consistent (linear) economic  structure,  the coefficients 
of  the trial solution can  be  determined.  Operationally,  a state vector  is  a 
set of  dated predetermined and  exogenous  variables  that,  when  included as 
arguments  in  a trial solution,  provide a consistent  set of identities relating 
structural  parameters  of  the system  to  the coefficients  in  the trial 
solution. If  a trial solution is found to  be  inconsistent with the  structure, 
then the  state vector on  which it  is based  is inadequate  and  must  be  expanded 
(assuming  the structure itself is consistent). 
Unfortunately,  the state vector is nonunique;  there are an  indefinitely 
large set of  vectors adequate  to  describe the current state.  From  among 
this adequate  set,  the analyst may  choose  a particular state vector for 
analytical  convenience.  McCallum (1983)  has  suggested  the employment  of a 
minimal  state vector,  which  is the smallest-dimensioned vector adequate  to 
describe  the current state of the system.  A  state vector  is  a minimal  state 
vector if none  of its elements  can  be  left  out of  the trial solution without 
making  the trial solution inconsistent with the structure. 
Exogenous  and  predetermined variables explicitly appearing  in the 
structural  equations are obvious  candidates  for inclusion in the minimal 
state vector.  Sometimes,  but not always,  they comprise a minimal  state 
vector.  In  general,  however.  trial and  error must  be  employed  to  ensure 
that the state vector is adequate.  In the illustrative model,  the set of 
state variables explicitly appearing  in it  will constitute an  adequate  state 
vector that rules out bubbles,  or explosive paths for real money  balances, 
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restrictions already present in  the structure. ' 
In the illustrative model,  the exogenous  and  predetermined  variables 
appearing in  the structural representation are: 
St={l ,rt,et),  (10) 
including the unit "variable" that is  implicit.  A  trial solution in  terms 
of  the undetermined coefficients,  denoted as  n,,s,  is given in  equations 
(ll),  (12),  and  (13). 
pt=fllo+nllrt+n12et  (11) 
mt=n20+n21rt+I122et  (12) 
Rt=n30+n3  1rt+n32et  (13) 
Under  the information assumptions  and  using (ll),  the expectation of the 
future  price must  be 
Et-~~t+l=nl  o  (1  4) 
where  use  has  been  made  of Et(rt)=[do-yfld>l=O and  Et(et)=O. 
The  solution is  obtained by  substituting (ll),  (121,  (13),  and  (14)  into 
the structural equations  (61, (8>,  and  (9)  and  solving the resulting 
identities for all ni,  coefficients.  These  identities are  shown  below. 
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coefficients are then determined  to be  as  shown  below. 
When  these  expressions  for the  nijs are  substituted  into (ll),  (12),  and 
(13),  it is clear  that  the  solutions  for all endogenous  variables  are 
we1 1-defined. 
IV.  Interest Rate  Rules  Are  Infeasible 
As  argued  above,  an  interest  rate rule cannot  be  interpreted  as  a 
structural  equation;  it is a restriction on, the  behavior  of the  interest 
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reduced  form must  be  identical to  the interest rate rule.  This  section 
shows  that there is no  feasible policy choice--no set of  money  supply 
function parameters--that satisfies the requirement  that it  renders  the 
int.erest rate reduced  form identical  to  the interest rate rule. 
Consider  the  trivial interest rate rule 
Rt=R*.  (17) 
If an  economy  obeys  such  an  interest rate rule,  then the reduced  form 
coefficients in the interest rate equation of the trial solution,  (13),  must 
be 
113  0=R* 
n3  1=0 
llsr=O. 
The  second  and  third of these  restrictions render  the interest rate 
predetermined;  the first  restriction ensures  that the interest rate target 
R*  is  achieved.  In  view of  the  solution values for the I13,s  shown  in 
(16),  the interest rate rule requires 
R*=O 
l/(a+X+l)=O.  (19) 
Then  an  interest rate rule is feasible if  and  only if there exists a 
policy equation such  that (19)  holds.  But  there is  no allowable policy 
vector  {Ao  ,X,R*)  satisfying these  equations.  Specifical  ly,  there 
is  no finite X to satisfy n3l=fl32=(a+~+l)-'=O.  Nhile it  is true 
that 113  and  113* approach  zero as  X approaches  infinity, II,  and 
f13,  are undefined  at X=a  because if  X is not finite,  then (9) is not a 
valid expression of  the structural policy equation.  And if (9) is  not the 
policy equation,  something else describing monetary policy must  be  supplied to 
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assessed without a complete model. 
Of  course,  the argument  against the feasibility of an  interest rate rule 
depends,  so  far, on  the assumption  that the money  supply function  takes  the 
form (9).  Fortunately for the argument,  important  generalizations on  (9) 
can  be  made  without affecting the result that interest rate rules are 
infeasible.  Simple  inductive evidence,  in  the form of trying various 
candidates and  observing the implications,  suggests  that lagged realizations 
of  any  variables appearing in  the model  can  be  added  as  arguments  to the 
policy rule (these,  of course,  may  augment  the minimal  state vector)  without 
affecting  the infeasibility result. 
Apparently,  there is  only one money  supply function  that would make  an 
interest rate rule a feasible solution for the interest rate.  This money 
supply function is  of the form: 
mt=Ao+X,rt+A2et  (20) 
(which is  also the reduced  form for money),  where  the Xs  are policy choice 
parameters.  Then  the reduced form for the interest rate is: 
Rt  =  [(I-XI )/(l+a)lrt+C(l-X2)/(l+a)let.  (21  > 
In  view of  the latter, it is clear that if X1=A2=1, then  Rt=R*=O. 
Therefore,  if policy can  condition the money  stock arbitrarily on  the state 
vector,  as  in (20),  then an  interest rate rule is feasible--there  exists 
{A,  ,A,  ,A2)  such  that R,  i  s predetermined. 
This alternative money  supply function,  (20),  could be  made  operational 
only if the policymaker  had  complete  current information,  that is, if the 
authorities could observe  the complete,  current state of the economy, 
1  r,e  But  in the realistic case  in  which  the authorities do 
not have  full knowledge of the current underlying shocks,  because  of 
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generates  predetermined  behavior  for the  interest rate.  An  interest rate 
rule is infeasible because it  is inconsistent with the  structural 
assumptions  of the model  (no money  illusion) and  the informational 
assumption  (policy authorities have  incomplete current information). 
V.  Interest Rate  Rules  Are  Not  Limiting Cases  of Money  Supply Functions 
This  section considers  the idea that an  interest rate rule is a limiting 
case of a money  supply  rule,  an  idea that has  been  attributed to 
McCallum.  This  section disproves  this idea and  ends  with an  account  of 
how  this idea arises from a failure to  distinguish between  reduced form and 
structural equations. 
McCallum  proves  that as  X approaches  infinity,  the reduced  form 
coefficients,  the II,,s,  remain  well-defined.  The  point here  is that any 
finite X,  no matter how  large,  is consistent with determinacy.  This  point 
is  unexceptionable,  but the next  step in  his argument  is that,  because  the 
coefficients on  current innovations of the reduced form  for the interest 
rate,  113,  and  II32,  become  arbitrarily close  to  zero as  X gets 
larger,  that one  can  come  arbitrarily close  to  achieving an  interest rate 
rule.  Furthermore,  it then  seems  reasonable  to  say  that,  in the  limit,  the 
money  supply  function becomes  the interest rate rule. 
This  idea is important  to  refute because it  has  apparently become 
influential.  For  example,  Dotsey  and  King  (1986)  analyze  the effects of 
interest rate rules by  setting 1  equal  to  infinity:  "An  interest rate peg 
is the limiting case  of  a contemporaneous  response  to  interest rates  (i.e., 
CXI=~)."  (p.  37). 
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money  supply rules, it  is  helpful to recall the definition of  a  limit.  A 
limit  is  a  fixed point to  which an  infinite sequence  converges.  Not  all 
infinite sequences  have  limits nor,  if they exist,  are limits necessarily 
elements  of  the sequence.  Consider  an  infinite sequence  of X values. 
A={  XI,  XZ,  13, . .., Xj,  .... ) 
with Xl<Xz< ...  <Aj<  .... 
The  money  supply equation  (9)  defines a  transformation  T:A->M  where  M  is 
the infinite sequence  of money  supply functions: 
M={  m;=Xo+Xl  (Rt-R*) ,  m:=Xo+X2 (R,-R*) , 
m;=Xo+X3(Rt-R*),  ... , mT=Xo+Xj<R,-R*),  ....) 
If a  limiting money  supply function existed as  Xj  increased without 
limit, it  would  be  the expression for m:=Xo+Xj(R,-R*)  to  which  the 
sequence  M  converged  as  Xj  increases  without  limit.  Obviously,  such  a 
limit does  not exist. 
How,  then,  can  a  rule such as  (17)  have  been  mistaken for a  limiting case 
of (9>?  The  error arose from a  failure to  distinguish between  the policy rule 
(9>, which  is  a  structural equation,  and  the solution for  the interest rate. 
A  natural  source of this confusion is that the latter does in  fact possess  a 
fixed point, or  limiting function,  as  X approaches  infinity.  The  reduced 
form solution for R,,  given by  (13)  and  (161,  has  the limiting function or 
fixed point identical  to the interest rate rule,  R,=O. 
VI.  Interest Rate  Rules  Fail to Complete  the Model 
An  interest rate rule does  not complete  the model.  In  particular,  the 
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nonpolicy  structural equations  (6)  and  (8>, together  with an  interest rate 
rule such  as  (17),  do not provide  unique  bubble-free  solutions for  the price 
level  and  money  stock. 
Consider  the system  comprised  of (6),  (8>,  and  (17>,  shown  below  for 
convenience. 
Rt=rt+(Et-lpt+l-pt)  (6) 
mt-pt=ao-aRt+et  (8) 
Rt=R*  (17) 
The  money  demand  equation,  (81, is  of no use  in  determining the price 
level in this system.  (6)  and  (17)  together are  sufficient to  determine  the 
expected  rate of inflation, 
(Et-lpt+l-pt)=R*-rt,  (22) 
but the price level,  pt, is  undetermined,  being dependent on  an  unsupplied 
terminal  condition,  E,-lpt+l: 
pt=Et-lpt+l+R*-rt.  (23) 
By  substituting (23)  and  (17)  into (81,  it  is seen  that m,  is also 
dependent  one-for-one on  the unsupplied terminal  condition and,  hence,  is 
also indeterminate.  The  system  ((6) ,(8) ,(I711  is incomplete with 
respect to  p , and  m, . 
McCal lum evaluated  the completeness  of systems  such  as  ((6) ,(8) ,(17)) 
using a trial solution derived from the undetermined  coefficients method 
illustrated above.  Systems  for which  the trial solutions for mt  and  p, 
are nonunique  were  considered nominally indeterminate.  McCallum focuses on 
the conditions under  which the intercept coefficients of pt and  m,,  which 
are nlo  and  nro,  respectively,  fail to  be  uniquely determined,  because 
this is the manner  in  which  indeterminacy reveals  itself in  trial solutions. 
Such  analysis  is invalid,  however,  because it  depends  upon  assumptions  about 
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determined only from analysis of the complete  structural model.  If the 
structural model  or any  of its components  is unknown,  then there is no 
assurance  either that any  particular state vector  is  adequate  or that it  is 
consi  stent with the structure.  Demonstrations  that the reduced  forms  for 
money  and  prices are indeterminate in trial solutions are irrelevant in  an 
analysis of the completeness of  a model,  because  they assume 
knowledge--about  the state vector--that cannot be  assumed  if the 
completeness  of the model  is in  doubt. 
It  may  seem  that the state vector assumption is innocuous.  McCallum 
intends it  not as  a restriction on the  structure,  but rather as  a 
restriction on  the reduced form--one  that lets the structure speak  for 
itself.  Yet,  it  already assumes  that an  infinitude of  potential  state 
variables have  been  excluded as  arguments  in the money  supply function 
necessary  to  complete  the model.  Consider  the general  formulation for  the 
money  supply: 
m,  =  Xo+Xlrt+X2et 
+gym ,  - +gym  - + . .  .  +8ym ,  - + . .  . 
+e~pt-1+e;pt-2+. .  .+e;~,-~+.  . . 
+87rt-1+8;rt-2+...+e;tt-J+... 
+8:et-l+8:et-2+.  .  .+8;et-J+.  .  . 
+TI t+T2tL+. .  .+TJtJ+. .  .  . 
Notice that r, and  et--the  current state variables--must be  arguments  in 
the money  supply rule in  order for the interest rate rule to  be  feasible. 
There  is  a feasible interest rate rule associated with any  set of zero 
restrictions on  the 8s and  TS.  If all lags of state variables and  all 
time trends  are excluded  arbitrarily,  then the structure is  being restricted 
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this restriction can  be  made,  it  is because  the money  supply function is 
known  to  be  of the form shown  and  because it  is  further known  that the 
relevant parameters  are zero.  The  fact that variables such  as  pt-l, 
mt-,,  rt-,,  e,-l,  or t  do  not appear  in  either the nonpolicy  equations 
(6)  and  (8)  or in  the interest rate rule (17)  does  not mean  that such 
variables might not be  state variables;  that issue can  be  answered  only 
after the money  supply  function has  been  made  explicit to  complete  the model. 
VII.  Reinterpretation of  a Result Due  to  McCallum 
McCallum's  1981  article sought  to  show  how  an  interest rate rule could 
be  consistent with determined  values of  nominal  variables,  so  long as  the 
interest rate was  set in  order to  have  some  desired effect on  the money 
stock.  Because  his analysis  is influential,  some  reconciliation between  his 
analysis and  that of this article is called for. 
McCallum assumed  that "...the  monetary  authorities adopt a feedback  rule 
for the  interest rate  ...."  (1981,  p.  319)  It is  not clear whether  this 
means  that the authorities make  the interest rate predetermined  through 
choice of an  appropriate money  supply  function,  or whether it  means  that the 
interest rate itself is a policy instrument or a direct choice  variable.  In 
either case,  the assumption runs into problems  discussed above  concerning 
the feasibility of an  interest rate rule.  But even  though  such  a rule 
should not be  considered a policy rule,  and  even  though  an  interest rate 
rule is infeasible, McCallum
ls  analysis can  still be  considered for what it 
says  about  whether  interest rate rules (however  they may  come  into force) 
complete  the model  in  the sense  of rendering nominal  magnitudes 
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addressed. 
The  following discussion presents  McCallum's assumptions  about monetary 
policy in  a simplified form,  but one  essentially adequate  to the issues  at 
hand.  The  original analysis  involved additional,  nonessential  dynamic 
elements,  with money  targets depending  on  the lagged  state and  with the 
interest rate rule calling for smoothing  of interest rate movements. 
McCallum motivated the interest rate rule in  the following way.  The 
authorities,  wishing to  exert effective control over  the money  stock,  choose 
the interest rate in  a manner  consistent with a predetermined money  target. 
Letting the money  target be  a fixed value,  PO, for simplicity,  the 
authorities then  set R,  in such  a way  that 
Et-lmt=po  (24) 
via some  appropriately  chosen  interest rate rule.  Such  an  interest rate 
rule can  be  found by  setting the expectation of  money  demand  equal  to  the 




The  interest rate rule that achieves  this is then 
R,=(lla){Et-,pt+ao-po}.  (27) 
McCallum  regarded this last equation as  the specification  of policy behavior. 
Given  these assumptions,  there is a well-defined equilibrium for all 
endogenous  variables in terms  of a trial solution in the minimal  state 
vector.  From  this, McCallum  concludes  that an  interest rate rule is 
consistent with nominal  determinacy. 
However,  this line of reasoning does  not provide an  argument  that 
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conclusion is  essentially among  the premises.  McCallum's  demonstration 
hypothesizes  that a nominal  variable--the money  stock--is rendered 
determinate by  appropriate choice of the interest rate rule without actually 
explaining how  that could come  about.  Then it  is shown  that this assumption 
is  adequate  to  completely determine  the solution to  the model,  including a 
unique bubble-free price level. 
Formally,  McCallum's argument  has  the following essential  structure. 
Hypothe.si  s : 
(HI)  There  exists a solution in  terms of the state vector  St: 




(HZ)  The  interest rate obeys  an  interest rate rule (a direct imp1  ication of 
(27)  > : 
n3  1=n32=0 
(H3)  The  prior expectation of  money  is  predetermined  (in this example,  an 
exogenous  constant): 
Et-lmt=po  (24) 
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(C1)  All the HijS are uniquely determined,  including lllo  and 
0.  Since  the llijs are well-defined,  no indeterminacies 
arise. 
If it  is intended  to  prove that an  interest rate rule is  feasible,  and 
some  might  interpret McCallum's  argument  in  that way,  then it  obviously 
should not make  assumption  HZ  of the hypothesis.  As  stated above,  however, 
McCallum's  argument  can  also be  examined  for  what it  says  about completeness 
and  nominal  determinacy,  which  is  a  conceptually distinct issue.  But if the 
argument  is intended  to  prove that an  interest rate rule completes  the model 
in  the sense  of rendering all nominal  magnitudes  determinate,  and of  course 
the argument  is used  for that purpose,  then it  should not make  assumptions 
H1  or H3.  Assumptions  H1  and  H3  directly imply ll,o=po.  This,  in 
conjunction with the money  demand  equation,  (8),  implies that Olo=po-~o. 
Hence,  if II,, is determined -- which it  is  by  the assumption  H3--then 
IIlo  is also determinate.  But if nominal  indeterminacy  is to occur,  it 
will apply to  both money  and  prices.  Hence,  a  convincing argument  would  not 
assume  the determinacy of  either mt  or pt, but rather would  show  how  their 
determinacy can  come  about under  an  interest rate rule. 
The  idea that the interest rate can  be  manipulated for the control of 
money--the  idea of the interest rate as  an  instrument for the control of 
money--is  based  on  an  implicit confusion between  real and  nominal  quantities. 
In  view of the money  demand  function--which is a  relation between  real money 
balances,  exp(mt-p,),  the interest rate,  and  a demand  shock--variations in 
the interest rate have  their effect  on  the real quantity of  money,  not on  the 
nominal  quantity.  The  money  demand  function implies no necessary relation 
between  the nominal  interest rate and  the nominal  quantity of  money.  If such 
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by  which  the assumption  H3  could be  implemented. 
As  it is,  there is  no explanation offered of how  this control over  the 
expectation of  money  is to  be  achieved.  What,  then,  is the specification of 
policy underlying the determinate  solution and  the interest rate rule?  If it 
is  assumed  that some  money  supply function does  complete  the model,  then it  is 
possible to  infer that this money  supply function is 
mt=Xo+rt+et.  (28) 
Consider  the "policy rule,"  (27).  When  the solution for Et-,pt=IIl,  is 
substituted into it, the result is 
5  Rt =  0.  (27' ) 
In  other words,  the  "policy rule" boils down  to  a statement  that the interest 
rate is predetermined.  But it  has  already been  argued  in  section IV that 
this result is feasible only if  the authorities can  observe  the full  current 
state and  effect the money  supply function (28). 
Formally,  if H5  is  added  to  the hypothesis,  then C2  can  be  added  to  the 
conclusion,  where  H5  and  C2  are as  follows: 
(H5)  The  model  is  complete  (a money  supply function exists). 
(C2)  The  money  supply function is (28). 
Buttressing this conclusion  is that the n,,s  in  the  solution are 
precisely those  that occur under  the money  supply  function  (28). 
It seems,  then,  that the idea that the interest rate is used  as  an 
instrument or lever for indirect control over money  plays no effective role 
in  rendering prices or money  determinate.  Instead,  determinacy arises 
because  sufficient side restrictions,  for example,  H1  and  H3,  have  been  made 
that substitute perfectly for the assumption  that the money  supply function 
is  (28),  thus  completing  the model  and  providing unique  solutions for all 
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Canzoneri,  Henderson,  and  Rogoff (1983)  also make  sufficient  side 
assumptions--that money  has  a fixed,  predetermined  trend--to make  the model 
complete.  McCallum (1986)  provided a demonstration  that the fixed-trend 
assumption  is not implied by  the interest rate rule.  This interesting point 
is  a special  case  of the more  general  proposition that few  restrictions on 
the money  supply function or on  the behavior  of nominal  variables are implied 
by  the incomplete  system  {(6>,(8)  ,(17)). 
VIII.  Summary  of Conclusions 
Interest rate rules are infeasible. 
An  interest rate rule predetermines  the interest rate;  that is,  an 
interest rate rule makes  the interest rate a strict function of the lagged 
state.  If the  interest rate is to  be  rendered predetermined,  then  the money 
supply must  somehow  be  able  to  offset the effects of current shocks  on  the 
interest rate.  The  interest rate rule is  infeasible because  economic 
disturbances  are not contemporaneously observable  by  the authorities,  so that 
the interest-rate-stabilizing  money  supply response  to  those disturbances 
cannot be  forthcoming on  the  timely basis  required.  Instead,  the authorities 
must  depend  on movements  in the interest rate itself to  convey  the underlying 
disturbances  affecting the interest rate.  Changes  in the money  supply can  be 
conditioned on  variations  in  the current interest rate to  any  arbitrary, 
finite degree,  but these money  changes  cannot  absolutely eliminate interest 
rate movements,  for then  there would be  no movements  in  the interest rate 
upon  which  to  condition money  supply movements  in  the first  place.  Hence, 
interest rate rules are  infeasible  unless  the authorities can  condition money 
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cannot,  because  they do not possess  complete current information. 
Interest rate rules fail to  complete prototype macroeconomic  models  with 
rational expectations  and  a real money  demand  function. 
If the policy design is to  reflect any  degree  of  concern about  nominal 
variables,  then--with the present state of  macroeconomic  science--the policy 
must  place direct constraints on  the nominal  money  supply.  More  precisely, 
there must  be  direct constraints placed on  the relation between  the nominal 
money  stock and  the observed  state of  the economy.  But  any  completely 
specified policy can  be  formulated in  terms  of such  a money  supply function. 
Suppose,  for argument,  that an  interest rate rule is feasible.  An 
interest rate rule predetermines  the interest rate.  This means  that the 
relative price term in  the real money  demand  function is  predetermined. 
There  is  no way  to  manipulate this relative price so  as  to control  the 
nominal  money  stock;  it  can  be  used only to  influence  the expectation of the 
real money  stock.  If only the real money  stock,  or ratio between  nominal 
money  and  the price level,  is determined,  then neither nominal  money  nor  the 
price level  is  determined. 
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1.  The  issues of this article are not materially affected if private agents 
are given some  or all current information in  forming future price 
expectations,  or even if they are given perfect foresight. 
2.  This  is  not generally the case.  In  dynamic  models  with rational 
expectations,  a  state vector adequate  to  describe all interesting (non-bubble) 
solutions  for a given,  well-specified model  will generally include state 
variables not explicitly present  in the structural form.  This  point is 
discussed in  Hoehn  (1986). 
3.  McCallum (1986)  is  ambiguous  as  to  whether  he  means  that an  interest rate 
rule is a money  supply function with X=m,  or that an  interest rate rule is 
the  1  imi  ting case  of  a money  supply  function as  X  approaches  m.  He 
clearly means  at least one  of these  statements,  and  possibly both.  The 
previous  section argued  that if  X=a,  the money  supply function is 
undefined  so  that any  expressions dependent  on it, such  as  the reduced  form 
for  the interest rate,  are also undefined. 
4.  There  seems  to  be  no assurance  of the existence of  any  finitely 
dimensioned  state vector  that is  adequate  to  describe the position of  the 
system,  unless  some  sort of  restriction on  the money  supply rule is  made. 
5.  Equations  (27)  and  (27') are particularly difficult to think of  as  means 
for  controlling money,  because  they call for a fixed interest rate.  McCallum 
introduced nonessential  dynamic  elements  into the description of  policy and 
derived a determinate solution for nominal  variables that was  consistent  with 
it.  Dynamic  elements  were  thereby  introduced into the determination of  money 
and  prices as  well  as  the interest rate.  But whether or not dynamic  elements 
are introduced,  there is no  sense  in  which  the interest rate rule exerts 
control over money  or prices or renders  either determinate. 
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